Robust Deep Learning: Where Are We?

Ju Sun (Computer Sci. & Eng.) Oct 20th, 2023 MnRI Colloquium




Success of deep learning (DL) not news anymore



Commercial breakthroughs ...







healthcare credit: Google AI




smart-home devices credit: Amazon



robotics credit: Cornell U.

Robustness issues of DL not news anymore






FOOLING THE AI

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are brilliant at image recognition — but they can be easily hacked.

These stickers made an artificial-intelligence system read this stop sign as 'speed limit 45'.



Robustness issues across domains/tasks

"panda"

 \boldsymbol{x}

Name entry Recognition



Submitted on

A Multil

Inputs

Akshay Srin

Adversaria

multilingua

input. Our



man and Hindi. While exact results differ depending on language/datasets, our key findings from these experiments can be summarized as follows:

- 1. NER models for all three languages are sensitive to adversarial input.
- 2. Adversarial fine-tuning and re-training could improve the performance of NER models both on original and adversarial test sets, without requiring additional manual labeled data.

Adversarial

detection fails

we performed a nall perturbations in the German and Hindi) are

not very robust to such changes, as indicated by the fluctuations in the overall F1 score as well as in a more finegrained evaluation. With that knowledge, we further explored whether it is possible to improve the existing NER

Robustness issues across models

Tutorial

Foundational Robustness of Foundation Models

Abstract

Foundation models adopting the methodology of deep learning with pre-training on largescale unlabeled data and finetuning with task-specific supervision are becoming a mainstream technique in machine learning. Although foundation models hold many promises in learning general representations and few-shot/zero-shot generalization across domains and data modalities, at the same time they raise unprecedented challenges and considerable risks in robustness and privacy due to the use of the excessive volume of data and complex neural network architectures. This tutorial aims to deliver a Coursera-like online tutorial containing comprehensive lectures, a hands-on and interactive Jupyter/Colab live coding demo, and a panel discussion on different aspects of trustworthiness in foundation models. More information can be found at https://sites.google.com/view/neurips2022-frfm-turotial

VeurIPS 2022


https://research.ibm.com/publications/foundational-robustness-of-foundation-models

Two kinds of robustness



"panda"

57.7% confidence





"gibbon" 99.3% confidence

Defocus Blur Frosted Glass Blur Gaussian Noise Shot Noise Impulse Noise



Motion Blur Zoom Blur





credit: openai.com


Adversarial examples

credit: ImageNet-C

Natural corruptions

Other dimensions in trustworthy AI

- Trustworthiness: robustness, fairness, explainability,
- transparency



Outline

• Evaluation of adversarial robustness

Optimization and Optimizers for Adversarial Robustness https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.13401

• Fundamental challenges in evaluating & achieving robustness


Optimization and Optimizers for Adversarial Robustness https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.13401

• Selective prediction

Margin As An Effective Confidence Score For Selective Classification Under Distribution Shifts (Forthcoming)

• Closing

Robustness evaluation (RE)



$$\begin{split} \max_{x'} \ell(y, f_{\theta}(x')) & \text{Maximize loss/error function} \\ \text{s.t. } d(x, x') \leq \varepsilon, \quad x' \in [0, 1]^n \\ \text{Allowable perturbation} & \text{Valid image} \\ & \text{Find robustness radius} \\ & \underbrace{\min_{x'} d(x, x')}_{s. \text{ t. } \max_{i \neq y} f_{\theta}^i(x') \geq f_{\theta}^y(x')}, x' \in [0, 1]^n \\ \text{On the decision boundary} & \text{Valid image} \end{split}$$

Report <u>robust accuracy</u> over an evaluation set

Constrained optimization problems

$$\begin{split} \max_{\boldsymbol{x}'} \ell\left(\boldsymbol{y}, f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{x}')\right) \\ \text{s.t.} \ d\left(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}'\right) \leq \varepsilon, \quad \boldsymbol{x}' \in [0, 1]^n \end{split}$$

Both objective and constraint functions are **nonconvex** in general, e.g., when containing DL models


$$\begin{split} \min_{\boldsymbol{x}'} \ d\left(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}'\right) \\ \text{s.t.} \ \max_{i \neq y} f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^{i}(\boldsymbol{x}') \geq f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^{y}(\boldsymbol{x}'), \ \boldsymbol{x}' \in [0,1]^{n} \end{split}$$

Projected gradient descent (PGD) for RE

$$\max_{\mathbf{x}'} \ell(\mathbf{y}, f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}'))$$

s.t. $d(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}') \leq \varepsilon$, $\mathbf{x}' \in [0, 1]^n$
$$\max_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{Q}} f(\mathbf{x})$$

 $\mathbf{x}_{k+1} = P_{\mathcal{Q}} \Big(\mathbf{x}_k - \alpha_k \nabla f(\mathbf{x}_k) \Big)$
 $P_{\mathcal{Q}}(\mathbf{x}_0) = \arg \min_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{Q}} \frac{1}{2} \|\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{x}_0\|_2^2$ Projection operator




Key hyperparameters:

(1) step size(2) iteration number

Algorithm 1 APGD

Problem with projected gradient descent



 $\max_{\boldsymbol{x}'} \ell\left(\boldsymbol{y}, f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{x}')\right)$ s.t. $d(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}') \leq \varepsilon$, $\boldsymbol{x}' \in [0, 1]^n$

Tricky to set: iteration number & step size i.e., tricky to decide where to stop

Reliable evaluation of adversarial robustness with an ensemble of diverse parameter-free attacks. Croce, F., Hein, M., ICML 2020 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2003.01690.pdf

Penalty methods for complicated d

 $\begin{array}{l} \max_{\boldsymbol{x}'} \ell\left(\boldsymbol{y}, f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{x}')\right) \\ \text{s. t. } d\left(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}'\right) \leq \varepsilon , \quad \boldsymbol{x}' \in [0, 1]^n \\ d(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}') \doteq \|\phi(\boldsymbol{x}) - \phi(\boldsymbol{x}')\|_2 \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{perceptual} \\ \phi(\boldsymbol{x}) \doteq [\ \widehat{g}_1(\boldsymbol{x}), \dots, \widehat{g}_L(\boldsymbol{x}) \] & \begin{array}{l} \text{distance} \end{array} \end{array}$

Projection onto the constraint is complicated

Penalty methods

$$\max_{\widetilde{\mathbf{x}}} \qquad \mathcal{L}(f(\widetilde{\mathbf{x}}), y) - \lambda \max\left(0, \|\phi(\widetilde{\mathbf{x}}) - \phi(\mathbf{x})\|_2 - \epsilon\right)$$

Solve it for each fixed λ and then increase λ

Algorithm 2 Lagrangian Perceptual Attack (LPA) 1: procedure LPA(classifier network $f(\cdot)$, LPIPS distance $d(\cdot, \cdot)$, input x, label y, bound ϵ) $\lambda \leftarrow 0.01$ 2: $\widetilde{\mathbf{x}} \leftarrow \mathbf{x} + 0.01 * \mathcal{N}(0, 1)$ ▷ initialize perturbations with random Gaussian noise 3: \triangleright we use S = 5 iterations to search for the best value of λ 4: for i in $1, \ldots, S$ do for t in $1, \ldots, T$ do 5: $\triangleright T$ is the number of steps $\Delta \leftarrow \nabla_{\widetilde{\mathbf{x}}} \left[\mathcal{L}(f(\widetilde{\mathbf{x}}), y) - \lambda \max\left(0, d(\widetilde{\mathbf{x}}, \mathbf{x}) - \epsilon\right) \right]$ 6: \triangleright take the gradient of (5) $\hat{\Delta} = \Delta / \|\Delta\|_2$ ▷ normalize the gradient 7: $\eta = \epsilon * (0.1)^{t/T}$ \triangleright the step size η decays exponentially 8: $m \leftarrow d(\widetilde{\mathbf{x}}, \widetilde{\mathbf{x}} + h\hat{\Delta})/h \quad \triangleright m \approx \text{derivative of } d(\widetilde{\mathbf{x}}, \cdot) \text{ in the direction of } \hat{\Delta}; h = 0.1$ 9: $\widetilde{\mathbf{x}} \leftarrow \widetilde{\mathbf{x}} + (\eta/m)\hat{\Delta}$ 10: \triangleright take a step of size η in LPIPS distance 11: end for 12: if $d(\widetilde{\mathbf{x}}, \mathbf{x}) > \epsilon$ then $\lambda \leftarrow 10\lambda$ \triangleright increase λ if the attack goes outside the bound 13: end if 14: 15: end for 16: $\widetilde{\mathbf{x}} \leftarrow \mathsf{PROJECT}(d, \widetilde{\mathbf{x}}, \mathbf{x}, \epsilon)$ 17: return $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}$ 18: end procedure

Ref Perceptual adversarial robustness: Defense against unseen threat models. Laidlaw, C., Singla, S., & Feizi, S. https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.12655

Problem with penalty methods

	cross-e	entropy loss	margin loss				
Method	Viol. (%) \downarrow	Att. Succ. (%) ↑	Viol. (%) ↓	Att. Succ. (%) \uparrow			
Fast-LPA	73.8	3.54	41.6	56.8			
LPA	0.00	80.5	0.00	97.0			
PPGD	5.44	25.5	0.00	38.5			
PWCF (ours)	0.62	93.6	0.00	100			

$$\begin{split} \max_{\boldsymbol{x}'} \ell\left(\boldsymbol{y}, f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{x}')\right) \\ \text{s.t.} \ d\left(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}'\right) &\leq \varepsilon \ , \quad \boldsymbol{x}' \in [0, 1]^n \\ d(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}') &\doteq \|\phi(\boldsymbol{x}) - \phi(\boldsymbol{x}')\|_2 \\ \text{where} \quad \phi(\boldsymbol{x}) &\doteq [\ \widehat{g}_1(\boldsymbol{x}), \dots, \widehat{g}_L(\boldsymbol{x}) \] \end{split}$$

LPA, Fast-LPA: penalty methods PPGD: Projected gradient descent

Penalty methods tend to encounter large constraint violation (i.e., infeasible solution, known in optimization theory) or suboptimal solution

PWCF, an optimizer with a principled stopping criterion on stationarity& feasibility

Ref Optimization and Optimizers for Adversarial Robustness. Liang, H., Liang, B., Peng, L., Cui, Y., Mitchell, T., & Sun, J. arXiv preprint arXiv:2303.13401.

Unreliable optimization = Unreliable RE

Issues and answers

projected gradient descent

 $\min_{\mathbf{x}\in\mathcal{Q}} f(\mathbf{x})$ $\mathbf{x}_{k+1} = P_{\mathcal{Q}}\Big(\mathbf{x}_k - \alpha_k \nabla f(\mathbf{x}_k)\Big)$

Issue: no principled stopping criterion /step size rules

penalty methods

```
\begin{array}{ll} \min_{\boldsymbol{x}} \ f(\boldsymbol{x}) & \text{s. t. } \ g(\boldsymbol{x}) \leq \boldsymbol{0} \\ \\ \min_{\boldsymbol{x}} \ f(\boldsymbol{x}) + \lambda \max(0, g(\boldsymbol{x})) \\ \\ \text{Solved with increasing } \ \boldsymbol{\lambda} \ \text{; sequence} \\ \\ \\ \text{Issue: infeasible solution} \end{array}
```

- Feasible & stationary solution Stationarity and feasibility check: KKT condition
- Reasonable speed Line search & 2nd order methods
- A hidden problem: nonsmoothness

A principled solver for constrained, nonconvex, nonsmooth problems



Nonconvex, nonsmooth, constrained

$$\min_{oldsymbol{x}\in\mathbb{R}^n}f(oldsymbol{x}), \hspace{0.1cm} ext{s.t.} \hspace{0.1cm} c_i(oldsymbol{x})\leq 0, \hspace{0.1cm} orall \hspace{0.1cm} i\in\mathcal{I}; \hspace{0.1cm} c_i(oldsymbol{x})=0, \hspace{0.1cm} orall \hspace{0.1cm} i\in\mathcal{E}.$$

Penalty sequential quadratic programming $\min_{d \in \mathbb{R}^n, s \in \mathbb{R}^p} \mu(f(x_k) + \nabla f(x_k)^T d) + e^T s + \frac{1}{2} d^T H_k d$ (P-SQP) s.t. $c(x_k) + \nabla c(x_k)^T d \le s, s \ge 0,$

Advantage: 2nd order method (BFGS) \rightarrow high-precision solution

Principled line search, stationarity/feasibility check

Ref Curtis, Frank E., Tim Mitchell, and Michael L. Overton. "A BFGS-SQP method for nonsmooth, nonconvex, constrained optimization and its evaluation using relative minimization profiles." Optimization Methods and Software 32.1 (2017): 148-181.

Our PyGranso (and NCVX framework) <u>https://ncvx.org/</u> $GRA \bigvee SO + OPTorch$



NCVX: A General-Purpose Optimization Solver for Constrained Machine and Deep Learning

Buyun Liang, Tim Mitchell, Ju Sun

Strategies to speed up PyGranso for RE

$$\begin{split} \max_{\boldsymbol{x}'} \ell\left(\boldsymbol{y}, f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{x}')\right) \\ \text{s.t. } d\left(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}'\right) \leq \varepsilon \ , \quad \boldsymbol{x}' \in [0, 1]^n \end{split}$$

Constraint folding: many constraints into few

$$egin{aligned} h_j(oldsymbol{x}) &= 0 &\Longleftrightarrow |h_j(oldsymbol{x})| \leq 0 \ , \ c_i(oldsymbol{x}) &\leq 0 &\Longleftrightarrow \max\{c_i(oldsymbol{x}), 0\} \leq 0 \ , \end{aligned}$$

$$\mathcal{F}(|h_1(\boldsymbol{x})|, \cdots, |h_i(\boldsymbol{x})|, \max\{c_1(\boldsymbol{x}), 0\}, \\ \cdots, \max\{c_j(\boldsymbol{x}), 0\}) \leq 0,$$

$$\min_{\boldsymbol{x}'} \ d\left(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}'\right)$$
s.t.
$$\max_{i \neq y} f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^{i}(\boldsymbol{x}') \geq f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^{y}(\boldsymbol{x}') , \ \boldsymbol{x}' \in [0, 1]^{n}$$

Two-stage optimization

- 1. Stage 1 (selecting the best initialization): Optimize the problems by PWCF with R different random initialization $\boldsymbol{x}^{(r,0)}$ for k iterations, where $r = 1, \ldots, R$, and collect the final first-stage solution $\boldsymbol{x}^{(r,k)}$ for each run. Determine the best intermediate result $\boldsymbol{x}^{(*,k)}$ following Algorithm 1.
- 2. Stage 2 (optimization): Warm start the optimization process with $x^{*,k}$ until the stopping criterion is met i (i.e., reaching both the stationarity and feasibility tolerance, or reaching the MaxIter K).

First general-purpose, reliable solver for RE

$$\begin{split} \max_{\boldsymbol{x}'} \ell\left(\boldsymbol{y}, f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{x}')\right) \\ \text{s.t. } d\left(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}'\right) \leq \varepsilon , \quad \boldsymbol{x}' \in [0, 1]^n \end{split}$$

$$\begin{split} \min_{\boldsymbol{x}'} \ d\left(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}'\right) \\ \text{s.t.} \ \max_{i \neq y} f^{i}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{x}') \geq f^{y}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{x}') \ , \ \boldsymbol{x}' \in [0,1]^{n} \end{split}$$

Reliability

- SOTA methods No stopping criterion (only use maxit); step size scheduler
- PWCF (ours) Principled line-search criterion and termination condition

Generality

- SOTA methods Can mostly only handle several lp metrics (l1,l2,linf)
- PWCF (ours)

Any differentiable metrics and both min and max forms

E.g., perceptual distance

 $egin{aligned} & d(m{x},m{x}')\doteq \|\phi(m{x})-\phi(m{x}')\|_2 \ & ext{where} \quad \phi(m{x})\doteq [\;\widehat{g}_1(m{x}),\ldots,\widehat{g}_L(m{x})\;] \end{aligned}$

A quick example

$$\begin{split} \max_{\boldsymbol{x}'} \ell\left(\boldsymbol{y}, f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{x}')\right) & \quad d(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}') \doteq \|\phi(\boldsymbol{x}) - \phi(\boldsymbol{x}')\|_2 \\ \text{s.t. } d\left(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}'\right) &\leq \varepsilon, \quad \boldsymbol{x}' \in [0, 1]^n & \quad \text{where} \quad \phi(\boldsymbol{x}) \doteq [\;\widehat{g}_1(\boldsymbol{x}), \dots, \widehat{g}_L(\boldsymbol{x})\;] \end{split}$$

	cross-	entropy loss	margin loss				
Method	Viol. (%) \downarrow	Att. Succ. (%) \uparrow	Viol. (%) ↓	Att. Succ. (%) \uparrow			
Fast-LPA	73.8	3.54	41.6	56.8			
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PPGD	5.44	25.5	0.00	38.5			
PWCF (ours)	0.62	93.6	0.00	100			

PyGranso has enabled much more

 $\min_{\mathbf{x}\in \mathbb{R}^n} f(\mathbf{x}), ext{ s.t. } c_i(\mathbf{x}) \leq 0, orall i \in \mathcal{I}; \ c_i(\mathbf{x}) = 0, orall i \in \mathcal{E}$

First general-purpose solver for constrained DL problems

Pygranso

NCVX PyGRANSO Documentation

Q Search the docs ...

Introduction Installation Settings Examples



NCVX: A General-Purpose Optimization Solver for Constrained Machine and Deep Learning

Buyun Liang, Tim Mitchell, Ju Sun

Topology optimization

 $\min_{\boldsymbol{\theta}.\boldsymbol{u}} \boldsymbol{u}^{\mathsf{T}} \boldsymbol{K}(\boldsymbol{G}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{\beta})) \boldsymbol{u} \quad \text{s.t.} \ \boldsymbol{K}(\boldsymbol{G}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{\beta})) \boldsymbol{u} = \boldsymbol{f},$ $\sum_{i \in \Omega} [\boldsymbol{G}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{\beta})]_i = v_0, \ \boldsymbol{G}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{\beta}) \in \{0,1\}^n$

Imbalanced learning

$$\max_{\boldsymbol{\theta},t} \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \mathbbm{1}\{y_i = +1\} \mathbbm{1}\{f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{x}_i) > t\}}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \mathbbm{1}\{f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{x}_i) > t\}}$$

s.t. $\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \mathbbm{1}\{y_i = +1\} \mathbbm{1}\{f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{x}_i) > t\}}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \mathbbm{1}\{y_i = +1\}} \ge \alpha$

Constrained deep learning for the efficient discovery of stable solid-state materials

PIs: Chris Bartel (CEMS), Ju Sun (CS&E)

Background

0

Machine/deep learning (MDL) has emerged as a novel tool in material science and engineering (MSE).¹ MDL models in MSE can be broadly categorized as "property prediction models" (PPMs) or "interatomic potentials" (IPs). For the former, the goal is to learn the mapping between material representations and material properties (e.g., formation energy, band gap, etc.). These representations can be compositional,² requiring only the chemical formula (e.g., Al₂O₃), or structural,³ requiring the formula and the 3D arrangement of ions on a periodic lattice (e.g., Al₂O₃ in the corundum structure with specified coordinates for Al and O). IPs make use of a structural representation, but instead of learning to predict a single property, these models learn to predict the energies, forces, and stresses of an arbitrary configuration of ions on a periodic long can perform a set of tasks and analyses that are usually

Outline

• Evaluation of adversarial robustness

Optimization and Optimizers for Adversarial Robustness https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.13401

• Fundamental challenges in evaluating & achieving robustness

Optimization and Optimizers for Adversarial Robustness https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.13401


• Selective prediction

Margin As An Effective Confidence Score For Selective Classification Under Distribution Shifts (Forthcoming)

• Closing


RE tractable even with PWCF?

$$\begin{split} \max_{\boldsymbol{x}'} \ell\left(\boldsymbol{y}, f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{x}')\right) \\ \text{s.t. } d\left(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}'\right) \leq \varepsilon \ , \quad \boldsymbol{x}' \in [0, 1]^n \end{split}$$




- Assuming 0-1 loss
- Typical over-specification of ε means there are potentially infinitely many solutions, with different patterns

Is the intuition right?



Is the intuition right?


Measured by **sparsity levels** of the perturbations found



$$\begin{split} \max_{\boldsymbol{x}'} \ell\left(\boldsymbol{y}, f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{x}')\right) \\ \text{s.t. } d\left(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}'\right) \leq \varepsilon \;, \quad \boldsymbol{x}' \in [0, 1]^n \end{split}$$

We need to **enumerate** all possible solutions if we want reliable RE using max-form

Implications -



Take-away: Max-form RE is fundamentally intractable, unless a good *c* is set—which is hard


$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{Implications - II} \\ \text{Adversarial training} \end{array} \begin{array}{l} \sup_{\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}'} \ell\left(\mathbf{y}, f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}')\right) \\ \sup_{\mathbf{x}' \in \Delta(\mathbf{x})} \frac{1}{|\mathbf{x}' \in \Delta(\mathbf{x})|} \\ \lim_{\mathbf{\theta}} \mathbb{E}_{(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) \sim \mathcal{D}} \max_{\mathbf{x}' \in \Delta(\mathbf{x})} \ell\left(\mathbf{y}, f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}')\right) \end{array}$$

i.e., data augmentation with adversarial samples

We need to **enumerate** all possible patterns of adversarial samples if we want to achieve robustness, measured by the same d

Take-away: Adversarial training with the max-form augmentation won't achieve robustness

Any hopes remaining?



$$\begin{split} \max_{\boldsymbol{x}'} \ell\left(\boldsymbol{y}, f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{x}')\right) \\ \text{s.t. } d\left(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}'\right) &\leq \varepsilon , \quad \boldsymbol{x}' \in [0, 1]^n \\ \overbrace{\bigvee} \\ \overbrace{\bigotimes} \\ \min_{\boldsymbol{x}'} d\left(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}'\right) \\ \text{s.t. } \max_{i \neq y} f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^i(\boldsymbol{x}') \geq f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^y(\boldsymbol{x}') , \; \boldsymbol{x}' \in [0, 1]^n \end{split}$$

Take-away: the min–form (robustness radius) is more promising

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• Selective prediction

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We have a long way to go



TRUSTWORTHY AI RESEARCH THRUSTS

DARPA experts estimate that research in the following areas will be essential to creating trustworthy technology:

- Foundational theory, to understand the art of the possible, bound the limits of particular system instantiations, and inform guardrails for AI systems in challenging domains such as national security;
- Al engineering, to predictably build systems that work as intended in the real world and not
 just in the lab; and
- Human-AI teaming, to enable systems to serve as fluent, intuitive, trustworthy teammates to people with various backgrounds.

https://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/ai-forward

Safe Learning-Enabled Systems

PROGRAM SOLICITATION NSF 23-562



Directorate for Computer and Information Science and Engineering Division of Information and Intelligent Systems Division of Computing and Communication Foundations Division of Computer and Network Systems



Open Philanthropy Project LLC

National Science Foundation



Good Ventures Foundation


Full Proposal Deadline(s) (due by 5 p.m. submitter's local time):

May 26, 2023

January 16, 2024

https://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2023/nsf23562/nsf23562.htm

Imperfect AI models can still be deployed




A crucial component: allowing AI to restrain itself

predictor
$$f : \mathcal{X} \to \mathbb{R}^K$$
 selector $g : \mathcal{X} \to \{0, 1\}$
 $(f, g)(\boldsymbol{x}) \triangleq \begin{cases} f(\boldsymbol{x}) & \text{if } g(\boldsymbol{x}) = 1; \\ \text{abstain} & \text{if } g(\boldsymbol{x}) = 0. \end{cases}$


No prediction on uncertain samples and defer them to humans


$$g_{\gamma}(\boldsymbol{x}) = \mathbb{1}[s(\boldsymbol{x}) > \gamma]$$

Typically, selection by thresholding prediction confidence



Which confidence score?





 $\boldsymbol{z} \in \mathbb{R}^{K}$ contains the raw logits (RLs)

Our margin-based scores

Signed dist to the separating hyperplane

Binary SVMs: $f(oldsymbol{x}) = oldsymbol{w}^{\intercal}oldsymbol{x} + b$


Geometric margin: $y(\boldsymbol{w}^{\mathsf{T}}\boldsymbol{x} + \boldsymbol{b}) / \|\boldsymbol{w}\|_2$

Multiclass SVMs: $f(oldsymbol{x}) = oldsymbol{W}^\intercal oldsymbol{x} + oldsymbol{b}$

Geometric margin: $\frac{\boldsymbol{w}_{y'}^{\mathsf{T}} \boldsymbol{x} + \boldsymbol{b}_{y'}}{\|\boldsymbol{w}_{y'}\|_{2}} - \max_{j \in \{1, \dots, K\} \setminus y'} \frac{\boldsymbol{w}_{j}^{\mathsf{T}} \boldsymbol{x} + \boldsymbol{b}_{j}}{\|\boldsymbol{w}_{j}\|_{2}}$ Confidence margin: $(\boldsymbol{w}_{y'}^{\mathsf{T}} \boldsymbol{x} + \boldsymbol{b}_{y'}) - \max_{i \in \{1, \dots, K\} \setminus y'} (\boldsymbol{w}_{i}^{\mathsf{T}} \boldsymbol{x} + \boldsymbol{b}_{i})$ These scores are not affected by the logit
scalingDifference of dists between the
two nearest hyperplanes


Our margin-based scores

Geometric margin:




Benefit: We don't need to worry about the scale of \boldsymbol{z}

Additional benefit: robustness



On real data

ImageNet vs ImageNet-C



(a) IN (Clean)

(b) Gaussian blur Lv.1

(c) Gaussian blur Lv.3

(d) Gaussian blur Lv.5

	IN (Clean)		Gau	Gaussian Blur		В	Brightness		Fog			Snow			
α	0.1	0.5	1	0.1	0.5	1	0.1	0.5	1	0.1	0.5	1	0.1	0.5	1
$RL_{ m conf-M}$	0.16	0.53	2.39	0.37	1.31	<u>6.05</u>	0.21	0.72	3.35	0.14	0.79	4.21	0.17	0.95	4.80
$RL_{ m geo-M}$	0.27	0.59	2.43	0.57	1.36	6.04	0.33	<u>0.79</u>	3.39	0.25	0.86	4.22	<u>0.34</u>	1.02	<u>4.81</u>
$RL_{\rm max}$	5.54	4.05	4.57	9.74	7.38	9.52	7.38	5.17	6.06	7.74	5.77	7.01	9.44	6.44	7.90
SR_{\max}	3.19	2.40	3.38	5.02	4.02	7.39	4.07	2.90	4.53	3.92	3.07	5.37	5.35	3.67	6.13
$SR_{ m ent}$	4.28	3.13	4.04	6.80	5.63	8.71	5.51	4.01	5.48	5.56	4.37	6.42	7.29	5.07	7.27
$SR_{ m doctor}$	3.21	2.38	3.40	5.05	4.05	7.47	4.10	2.93	4.58	3.95	3.10	5.42	5.39	3.71	6.20

Outline

• Evaluation of adversarial robustness

Optimization and Optimizers for Adversarial Robustness https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.13401

• Fundamental challenges in evaluating & achieving robustness

Optimization and Optimizers for Adversarial Robustness https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.13401

• Selective prediction

Margin As An Effective Confidence Score For Selective Classification Under Distribution Shifts (Forthcoming)

• Closing

Closing

- A long way to go for DL robustness
- Selective prediction crucial for deploying imperfect AI

